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Abstract: In this paper we examine historical trends in the Silk Road where we discuss
historical trade risks, Chinese dynasties and trade. We examine trade risks along the land and
sea routes through Central Asia and Middle East. We discuss Chinese balance of payments
during different dynasties and the changes in the land and the sea routes. We examine how the
trade patterns and routes shifted with the discovery of the New World and when the Dutch and
the British formed pooled risk trade associations.

Introduction
China has gone through many changes in the 20th century and has emerged as one of the
largest trading countries in the world in its last two decades. In a way, China has reestablished
itself as a world trade power as she was during the historical Silk Road trade, where trade
corridors through land and sea across central Asia and the Middle East developed despite
numerous risks and hazards and where trade flourished for more than a millennium. Modern day
Chinese trade has, presently, developed again after doors were opened to China by US and
European countries in the 1970s and continues to grow. One can see the importance of trade in
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Chinese economics over this time period (see Table 1). Between 1979 to 2009, in thirty years,
Chinese GDP in constant 2005 dollars has grown from about 201 billion to about 3.5 trillion,
Chinese exports have grown from almost 5 % of their share in GDP to about 29 %, imports from
about 4 % to 24 percent. Trade surpluses have led to a large growth in China’s reserves, which
has allowed Chinese capital to move out for investments, mergers and acquisitions and to
become an important FDI source in the world’s financial stage.
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Table 1: Chinese Imports/Exports to the World 1979-2009 (In Billions of USD)

Year

Exports in
Constant 2005
USD

Imports in
Constant 2005
USD

GDP in
Constant 2005
USD

Exports as % of
GDP

Imports as % of
GDP

1979

8.19

16.67

200.65

4.98%

4.08%

1980

8.11

20.86

216.31

4.93%

3.75%

1981

8.77

23.43

227.55

5.41%

3.85%

1982

7.9

18.9

248.26

5.27%

3.18%

1983

9.07

20.71

275.32

4.81%

3.29%

1984

13.58

26.75

317.17

5.46%

4.28%

1985

25.72

40.75

359.99

6.15%

7.14%

1986

26.21

37.17

391.67

6.09%

6.69%

1987

26.31

38.88

437.1

6.59%

6.02%

1988

31.53

49.97

486.49

6.18%

6.48%

1989

31.76

52.75

506.44

5.82%

6.27%

1990

39.27

32.15

525.68

7.47%

6.12%

1991

48.35

41.01

574.05

8.42%

7.14%

1992

56.31

56.74

655.56

8.59%

8.66%

1993

66.4

79.14

747.34

8.89%

10.59%

1994

127.9

130.26

845.24

15.13%

15.41%

1995

134.94

142.62

937.37

14.40%

15.21%

1996

151.35

162.43

1031.11

14.68%

15.75%

1997

185.51

179.96

1127

16.46%

15.97%

1998

198.54

196.94

1214.91

16.34%

16.21%

1999

226.07

228.7

1307.24

17.29%

17.50%

2000

298.51

285.51

1417.05

21.07%

20.15%

2001

328.52

321.84

1534.66

21.41%

20.97%

2002

420.69

371.97

1674.32

25.13%

22.22%

2003

536.92

488.1

1841.75

29.15%

26.50%

2004

683.63

634.09

2027.77

33.71%

31.27%

2005

836.89

712.09

2256.9

37.08%

31.55%

2006

1008.85

804.05

2543.53

39.66%

31.61%

2007

1153.44

874.03

2904.71

39.71%

30.09%

2008

1141.6

828.14

3183.56

35.86%

26.01%

2009

1006.76

848.19

3476.45

28.96%

24.40%

*Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2013, retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/datacatalog/world-development-indicators, 5/8/2014
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This article examines historical trade relations and patterns of trade with the Middle
Eastern and Central Asian and European countries China traded with between the 7th and the 17th
centuries. We examine trade risks, trade trends and the political climate of Chinese-Middle East
and European trade.

Silk Road Trade in History
Figure 1: Routes on the Silk Road (7-17th centuries)

http://traumwerk.stanford.edu/philolog/2011/08/byzantine_silk_smuggling_and_e.html

The historical Silk Road was unparalleled in the diversity of territories, rulers, regimes,
languages, and religions through which it moved its merchandise. Sea routes developed as land
routes became more treacherous, costly, and unreliable, and as navigation tools helped reduce
navigation risks. Surviving trader travel records show that trade triumphed over many religious,
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Land routes and trade activity were fragmented, where goods from the East could come to rest in
a market of Central Asia, Persia, Syria or Eastern Anatolia, only to be picked once again and
carried to the Roman/Seljuk/Ottoman Empire or large European cities. In the face of these
challenges, the way that traders and rulers managed risk determined whether they flourished or
perished. Risks of robbery, piracy varies greatly and stemmed from diverse resources.
Unpredictably of risks and safety affected the choice of routes over time. Steensgard (1974, p.
61-62) mentions three areas, the Syrian desert, mountains between Ottoman and Persian Empires
and between Persian and Indian Empires as being extremely unsafe passages.
Ottoman, Safavid (Persian), and Mogul (Indian) administrations and rulers did not
necessarily have control over all their vast regions. Local princes, tribal leaders, and beys could
act both as tax gatherers, with a vested interest in making sure that trade was sustainable, and as
robbers, with short time horizons. Steensgaard (1974) states that, of the two, “from the
merchant’s point of view the tax-gatherer had one advantage….: he was to a larger degree
predictable.… Within the Islamic area there was apparently a tendency to maintain customs rates
once they were agreed upon” (63). To cope with the problem of bandits, on the other hand,
caravans incorporated armed guards into their caravans. They also employed local tribesmen as
guides in the frontier towns before they crossed into their territories.
Travel reports provide economic details illuminating risks, safety, as well as costs of
various routes from China and India. For instance, caravans paid premiums when traveling safer
roads, such as the Isfahan-Gombroon-Surat route (the latter in Gujarat, India), which saw higher
tax rates than the riskier Isfahan-Kandahar-Lahore route(the latter in Punjab, Pakistan). As time
went on, taxes continued to play an important role in routes’ competitiveness, as they do in trade
today. By the sixteenth century, reports describe intense competition among various land and sea
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route cities. Competing with each other were the cities of Erzurum and Van (in Asia Minor),
Gombroon (in Bandar Abbas, Iran) and Kandahar (in Afghanistan), and in general, land routes
and sea routes. Competition between cities forced Basra (in Iraq) to lower taxes to levy tariffs of
only 5%, while actually charging 4% (Steensgaard, 63, 67). Table 2 reports customs rates
charged by various cities in the late medieval/early modern period, as well as the contemporary
tariff rate charged by each nation’s modern-day equivalent taxes.

Table 2: Tariffs in the late medieval/early modern period and today
Country (Description)
Late medieval/early
21st-century tariffs* (date)
modern tariffs (date)
Portuguese, Straits of
11% in royal customs + 1% European Union: 5.5%
Hormuz
naval defense + 3% for non- (2012)
Christian merchants
Persian duties, from Dutch
13.5% (1637-38)
Iran: 26.6% (2011)
East India Company
Persian duties, Gombroon
10.75% + 3.6% export tax + Iran: 26.6% (2011)
1.22% + 100 dinars per bale
+ 650 in gifts (Total 16%)
(1682-83)
10%; refused passage if the Egypt: 16.8% (2012)
depots were full; Venetians
played the embargo at the
expense of French (p. 65)
Erzurum duties (Ottomans) Higher for cheaper silk from Turkey: 9.6% (2011)
Shirvan than more
expensive silk from Gilan.
The latter had more route
choices. In Erzurum,
bargained for 80 piastres per
bale, regardless of value. (p.
66)
th
Source: 17 -century data constructed from information in Steensgaard 1974, pp. 63, 65, and
198. Modern information from WTO World Tariffs Profile 2013.
* simple average of applied general non-preferential duty rate, all products
Cairo, pepper duties in kind

Table 3 reports the approximate GDP per capita of China and trading partners during the
Silk Road and compares it with a more current GDP per capita estimate. Given the time frame,
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the historical per capita numbers of are quite high, denoting that trade took place among the
wealthier areas during the Silk Road.
Table 3: GDP/Capita, Updated Estimates (1990 International Geary-Khamis Dollars)
Year
1000
1500
1600
1700
1820
2008
600
6,725
China
846
892
814
17,734
Spain
1,454
2,662
2,105
1,874
25,112
Holland/
Netherlands
1,164
975
923
14,583
Portugal
1,533
1,363
1,476
1,511
19,460
Italy (CenterNorth)
2,952
India
1
528
4,354
Indonesia
603
9,880
Malaysia
550
4,882
Sri Lanka
570
8,923
Thailand
527
2,926
Vietnam
574
629
22,175
Japan
335
1,122
North Korea
335
20,454
South Korea
584
2,888
Philippines
588
6,013
Iran
~600
~660
~700
~740
8,127
Turkey/
Byzantium/
Ottoman
Empire
658
7,556
Syria
~820
588
1,598
Iraq
3,913
Turkmenistan
5,237
Uzbekistan
10,639
Kazakhstan
1,556
Tajikistan
869
Afghanistan
2,965
Kyrgyzstan
1,001
Mongolia
Note: Tilde (~) stands for approximate.
Source: Reprinted with permission from Bolt & van Zanden 2013. For country-specific source
data, see Appendix.
Accessed: January 17, 2014, at http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm
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Principal-Agent Problem and Risks in Trade
Appointments of local administrators within the empires were ‘purchased’ by the
winners who paid monies to the central government, as had been the historical custom in ancient
empires. This created a principal-agent problem in that the appointees had a short time horizon
to collect taxes as well as get a return on their surcharges/bribes. If the totals were too high, this
would divert traders on the that particular route to alternate routes in the long run. Portugal
appointed administrators for 3 years, Levant appointed them for even less periods of time.
Legendary Shah Abbas of Persia solved this principal-agent problem during his reign (b1571d1621) by adding highway police (rahdari) to create a much safer route than those offered in
other regions by the Ottomans or by Christian (Portuguese) governments and furthermore
required local administrators to pay compensation for any caravan robberies that took place in
their territories, which also increased safe passage during his reign (Steensgaard, 67).
However, the fragmented nature of the routes meant that, for the majority of history, no
single party had an incentive to attempt to make the routes safer along their entire extent. It took
a body the size of the Mongol empire, whose vast territory gave it a clear interest in trade along
the extent of the route, to assume responsibility for trade route security throughout Central Asia.
For example, the Yüan (Mongol) Dynasty of China aggressively maintained shelters along routes
and issued documentation guaranteeing travelers “protection, accommodations, transportation,
and exemption from local taxes or duties” (Weatherford, 221). This type of large-scale
coordination to promote the security of the routes, however, was rare throughout history.
For the most part, risk management depended upon traders’ foresight and ingenuity. The
best ways to mitigate risk and to gain bargaining power, however, were not devised by countries
historically involved in the East-West trade, such as China, India, Persia, the Ottoman Empire, or
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Italy. Rather, the form of the organization that succeeded in long-term, large-scale trade came
from two northern countries, the Dutch Republic and the British Empire, who both sought to
enter the lucrative trade routes as outsiders. Instead of conducting individual initiatives, the
Dutch and British formed risk-sharing pools by issuing stocks. Chinese merchants had pioneered
a similar strategy, yet it was the Dutch and the British who employed it successfully on a large
scale over the long term. This proved an effective strategy, and the bargaining power that this
strategy afforded was so great that Shah Abbas gave the Dutch India Company capitulations on
tariffs. (Steensgaard 1974). We now explore, in more detail, the approaches to trade and risk
mitigation of various parties over time.

Silk Road Trade and Chinese Dynasties
Growth in Foreign Trade during the Tang Dynasty
The Tang dynasty, which lasted from 618 to 907 CE, saw significant developments in
foreign trade (Fairbank, 1992). During the seventh century, trade with Chinese Turkestan and
with modern-day Mongolia, Manchuria, and Korea was facilitated by Chinese conquest of these
regions. Encouraged by economic development, residents of China’s growing cities began to
acquire a taste for foreign goods that had previously been enjoyed only by the courts (Schafer,
1963). Foreign trade continued to bloom during the first half of the eighth century, described as
“a long epoch of wealth, safety, and low prices” when “the Chinese taste for the exotic
permeated every social class and every part of daily life” (Schafer, 1963, 8, 28).
This increase in foreign trade was facilitated both by improvements in transportation as
well as the official monetization of the Chinese economy that occurred in 731 (Schafer, 1963).
According to Hansen (2012), the Tang government had trouble minting sufficient bronze coins
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and therefore recognized bolts of silk as another form of currency, meaning that military
subsidies in the form of silk sent to troops in China’s northwest caused trade in those regions to
expand. Roads in general were safe and traversable. A canal system connecting the mouth of the
Yangtze River to the capital was upgraded, and a large road was built to connect the port city of
Canton with the heart of China. Drawn by the profits to be made, many foreigners came to live
and trade in China during the Tang dynasty (Schafer, 1963).
Records show that during the Tang Dynasty, four main routes through which China
experienced the outside world were the central land route; the southern sea route; the northern
land route; and the far southern sea route, also known as the “cinnamon route” (Adshead 2000,
82). Each route was an institution in its own right and supported a particular (often ethnic and
mobile) Central Asian and Middle East and African merchant community (Adshead 2000). Table
4 illustrates this ethnicity breakdown.
Table 4: Trade routes and their merchant communities under the Tang (618-908)
Trade Route
Central land route

Merchant Community
Syrians from northern Mesopotamia;
Sogdians from Transoxiana
Southern sea route
Merchants from Oman, Shiraz, Isfahan,
Basra; Persians from southwest Iran
Northern land route
Radhanite Jews
Far southern sea route
Afro-Indonesians of coastal East Africa
Table constructed from information in Adshead 2000, 72-83.

The main goods traded along these routes included spices, minerals, and textiles. Under
the cosmopolitan and outward-looking Tang, China imported enthusiastically; on the whole,
however, China ran a trade surplus as the West’s imports exceeded China’s (Adshead 2000).
Furthermore, the West needed China’s innovations more than China needed the West’s. From
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this trade, the West received technology for making silk, paper, and harnesses and stirrups, while
China received cotton, sugar, and improved glassmaking techniques (Adshead 2000)i.
While the central land route saw increased traffic under the Tang as compared to the past
due to Chinese conquest of Chinese Turkestan and modern-day Mongolia, Manchuria, and
Korea, the southern sea route transported more goods overall (Adshead 2000, Schafer 1963).
Under the Tang, the Indian Ocean was “a safe and rich ocean, thronged with ships of every
nationality”. Despite sailors’ various origins, Persian served as “the lingua franca of the
Southern Seas” (Schafer 1963, 12). During the Tang, the trading ships along this route were not
of Chinese origin; Chinese sailors who made the journey did so in foreign ships, such as the
famously large ships of Ceylon (Schafer 1963). Competition became keen between the land and
the sea routes.
Encouraged by economic development, residents of China’s growing cities began to
demand more imported goods. This increase in foreign trade was facilitated both by
improvements in transportation as well as the official monetization of the Chinese economy that
occurred in 731. Drawn by the profits to be made, many foreigners came to live and trade in
China during the Tang dynasty (Schafer 1963).
Trade under the Tang was “never free from political entanglements” (Schafer, 1963, 23).
Not only did the government heavily regulate which goods could enter and exit China while
seeking a cut from the distribution of those in the highest demand, but it also forced much of its
foreign trade into the framework of diplomacy (Schafer, 1963). Under the “tribute system,” as it
is called by historians, China’s neighbors (particularly nomadic tribes) were expected to send
gifts to the Chinese emperor as a way of recognizing China’s cultural superiority (Fairbank,
1992). The tribute system was meant to establish that the emperor of China “held Heaven’s
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Mandate” and that his “magnificent benevolence and compassion naturally attracted outsiders to
come and also be transformed by civilization” (Fairbank, 1992, 112). Tributary status was
generally expected of China’s neighbors regardless of whether the peoples in question were
actually dependent upon the Tang (Schafer, 1963). Because China’s neighbors were aware that,
in exchange for their tributary gifts, they would receive ample gifts from the Tang court in
return, most of them acquiesced to this arrangement “out of sheer self-interest” (Schafer, 1963,
24). Thus, the tribute system served as the “institutional setting and indeed cover for foreign
trade” (Fairbank,113).
As rebels and internal disasters brought down the Tang dynasty, they had the same
effects on trade. Trade routes were disrupted when borders became insecure, from modern-day
Yunnan province in China’s southwest, to the territory of the Uighur Turks in the northwest, to
Tibet (where the Gansu trade corridor was taken over), and finally to Canton, where pirates
helped to facilitate an attack and where foreign merchants were slaughtered by rebels in 879
(Schafer 1963, Adshead 2000). Trouble also arose on the western end of trading routes; the late
9th century saw the Persian Gulf port cities of Basra and Ubullah sacked by rebels, while an
earthquake destroyed the critical port of Siraf in 977 (Adshead 2000). In the absence of a unified
response, these challenges proved too great for traders and regional governments to overcome.
By the time the Tang dynasty ended in 908, foreign trade had decreased substantially (Adshead
2000).

Trade During Song Dynasty
After more than fifty years of instability following the fall of the Tang, the Song Dynasty
began in 960 CE (Fairbank 1992). The return of stability to China’s government benefited trade
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both domestic and foreign, and China’s trade with other East Asian countries grew both in scale
and regularity. Like the Tang before it, the Song played an active role in foreign trade,
establishing monopolies over the production of tea and salt, as well as over spice and incense
imports (Yoshinobu 1983). Under Emperor Huizong, one-third of government revenue flowed
from the salt monopoly, and one-twelfth flowed from the liquor monopoly. Unlike the Tang,
however, the Song dynasty took a more capitalist approach to managing the economy (Adshead
2000). Rather than tightly controlling all urban markets, “the state was now in partnership with
the merchants” (Adshead 2000, 117). International trade required silver, but for domestic use, the
Song mainly promoted copper, as well as paper money (Fairbank 1992, Yoshinobu 1983).
Overall, however, China ran trade deficits during the late Song, in contrast to its surplus during
the Tang. This trade deficit was due to Chinese demand for foreign goods so strong that exports
simply could not keep up (Fairbank 1992).
Historically, China had collected goods from its northern neighbors as part of the tribute
system, which served as foreign trade (Fairbank, 113). As northern non-Chinese rulers,
including the Tanguts, the Qidan, and the Jin, gained strength, however, the Song often found
itself paying rather than collecting tribute (Fairbank 1992). Despite the reversal of power, official
trade conducted through the tribute system continued. Accompanying the tribute caravans,
Uighur merchants would come into China to lend money and to arbitrage in gold, which was
more expensive in the Islamic world than in China (Yoshinobu 1983). Private foreign trade also
flourished through government-sanctioned markets, driven by increased demand from the urban
and well-to-do members of all peoples involved. The main commodities that the Song received
from its northern neighbors, through both official and private trade, included livestock (horses
and camels), jewels (jade, amber), textiles (cotton cloth, silk brocade), animal products (ivory,
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yak tail), frankincense and myrrh, weaponry (suits of armor, swords) and bullion (Yoshinobu
1983, 94). Table 5 provides detail on the Song’s trade relationships with its northern seminomadic neighbors.

Table 5: Song trade relations with semi-nomadic northern neighbors
People

Notable
dynasty
Liao

Location

Imports to Song

Exports from Song

Easter Inner
Mongolia /
Northern
China

horses, sheep, fur,
“woolen cloth, carpets,
brocade, silver and
golden ornaments, iron
suits of armor, slaves,
and lumber” (97)

Jurchen
(Ruzhen,
Jurched)

Jin
(Chin)

Northern
Manchuria

“horses, copper money,
silver, silk, pearls,
drugs, marten fur, dyes,
and salt” (103)

Tanguts

Hsi Hsia
(Xi Xia,
Western
Xia)

South and west
of the curve in
the Yellow
River; oversaw
critical parts of
caravan routes

“horses…, sheep…,
cattle, camels, dyes,
licorice, yellow wax,
musk, medicines, and
other such western
goods as borax, jade,
fine carpets, amber,
coral, and
frankincense” (101)

“silk, silk brocade, tea,
military weapons, marine
products, ginger, orange
peel,” dye, “medicines, and
silver and golden
ornaments,” Southeast
Asian goods (97)
“tea, silk, valuables from
Southeast Asia, ginger,
orange peel, cotton cloth,
rice and other grains,
lacquerware, porcelain,
wooden furniture, gold and
silver ornaments, writing
brushes, ink, copper
money, silver, books, and
weapons” (103)
“tea, silk, silver, exotic
items from southeast Asia,
porcelain lacquerware, and
silver and gold ornaments”
(101)

Qidan
(Khitan)

Ch’ingWest of
Horses, “mercury,
Sichuan and Shensi tea
t’ang
Tanguts
musk, and fur” (102)
(Western
Ch’iang)
Table constructed from information in Worthy 1983, Rossabi 1983, Fairbank 1992, quotes from
Yoshinobu 1983

169

Topics in Middle Eastern and African Economies
Vol. 17, Issue No. 2, May 2015

Overall, the main goods obtained by the Song through maritime trade included
“incense…, spices…, cotton, yellow wax, rhinoceros horn, ivory, pearls, silver, gold, tortoise
shells, and sulfur” while the goods that the Song exported included “silver, gold, silver and gold
ornaments, copper money, copperware, tinware, lacquerware, ironware, mercury, pottery,
porcelain, silk, silk cloth, linen, matting, books, and stationery” as well as tea, ginger, and paper
(Yoshinobu 1983, 108). Table 5 details the type of goods that the Song traded with East Asian
partners. Considering that re-export of imports was a common practice by countries along the
maritime routes, Yoshinobu (1983) conjectures that the Red Sea, Eastern Africa, and the Persian
Gulf were the original sources of the frankincense, myrrh, ambergris, fine carpets, ivory, and
coral that China obtained by sea.
How were the goods valued and bartered? Data are scanty, but a few examples of ‘price’
conversion ratios, or implicit prices circa the eleventh century, are given in Table 6. Although the
exchange of certain goods, including salt, weapons, and army provisions, was heavily restricted
or prohibited in certain situations, illegal trade also flourished (Yoshinobu 1983). Silver flowed
to correct trade imbalances, and the Song’s northern neighbors often profited as middlemen
within many trade relationships (Yoshinobu 1983).
Table 6: Examples of price ratios (ca. 11th century)
From Hsi Hsia

Equivalent Song Good
several catties of tea
20 bolts of silk
From Ch’ing-t’ang
Equivalent Song Good
one horse
100 catties of tea
Table constructed from information in Yoshinobu 1983, 101-102.
one sheep
one horse
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Finally, driven by Chinese demand for foreign luxuries and facilitated by the Islamic
diaspora, maritime trade became increasingly vast and important under the late Song Dynasty.
Adshead (2000) writes that, around this time, “the quantity of maritime shipping outside the
[Chinese] empire… was in fact of greater importance… than before or afterwards in Chinese
history” (129). Recognizing its profitability, the Song government chose not to restrict sea trade,
preferring to exploit it through various port offices instead (Yoshinobu 1983). During the late
Song, Chinese sea trade increased to the point that foreign trade constituted a significant portion
of government revenue “for almost the only time before the nineteenth century” (Fairbank 1992,
92). In fact, the early Song derived 2-3% of its total revenue from sea trade alone (Yoshinobu
1983, 106). By the time the Song capital was moved to Hangzhou, Chinese shipping technology
had improved substantially, incorporating techniques learned from Arabs as well as their own
insights (Yoshinobu 1983). These ships proved able to travel as far as East Africa (Fairbank
1992). Song porcelains exported at this time have been discovered as far away as Egypt,
Istanbul, and the Eastern Mediterranean, testifying to the scope of trade (Yoshinobu 1983).
Nonetheless, disagreement remains as to whether Chinese or Arab ships actually conducted the
majority of trade (Fairbank 1992, Yoshinobu 1983). Regardless, many Chinese were attracted by
the opportunities for wealth and became sea merchants (Yoshinobu 1983). Adshead (2000)
writes that “private shipbuilding equaled or exceeded that of the state and overseas trade, in
particular, was private rather than public” (117). Chinese merchants venturing abroad
contributed to the establishment of Chinese settlements throughout Southeast Asia (Adshead
2000, Yoshinobu 1983). The goods traded during the Song Dynasty are given in Table 7.
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Table 7: Goods traded by sea during the Song
Partner
Japan

Imports to Song
“gold, silver, copper, sulfur,
mercury, drugs, lumber,
pearls, steel swords, fine
furniture”

Korea

“silver, lacquerware,
matting, copper ware,
celadons, pongee, linen, fur,
musk, dyes, ginseng, and
medicines”
aloe wood, incense, spices

Southeast Asia

Exports from Song
“silk, silk brocade, cotton
cloth, aloe wood,
sandalwood, ambergris,
materials for fine furniture,
books, dyes, porcelains, and
copper cash”
“myrrh, incense, spices,
rhinoceros horn, ivory, rare
birds and flowers (all from
Africa and Southeast Asia),
silk, mercury, and books”
“silver and gold; silk, silk
brocade; porcelains;
lacquerware; parasols;
ironware; matting; silk fans;
leather drums; glass and
pearl ware; cochineal; wine;
rice; sugar; salt; Indian red”

Table constructed from information in Yoshinobu 1983, 108

As Chinese merchants began to travel extensively throughout Southeast Asia, merchants
adopted several risk-management techniques. Yoshinobu (1983, 108) writes that “large-scale
trade was often initially unorganized, hazardous, and seasonal, and the merchants were for the
most part itinerants,” making risk management essential. Temporary partnerships thus arose,
including instances of agents who carried out voyages on behalf of capital-providing merchants,
and sometimes including a third ship-owning party as well. In Mingzhou, Wenzhou, and
Taizhou, what Yoshinobu (1983, 108) refers to as “crude forms of commenda and societas
maris” arose. In both a commenda and a societas maris, capital was pooled for use in trade,
which was carried out either by merchants on behalf of a wealthy backer (commenda) or by the
suppliers of the capital themselves (societas maris). In both the commenda and the societas
maris, profits were distributed proportionately to capital contribution (Yoshinobu 1983).
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Although the Chinese forms of commenda and societas maris were temporary partnerships,
Adshead (2000, 117) claims the existence “also of joint stock companies” called “lien-ts’ai hopen” . The scope and longevity of these supposed joint-stock companies is unclear.

Yüan Dynasty and trade
In 1276 CE, Mongol forces led by Khubilai Khan, grandson of Genghis Khan, overtook Song
forces at Hangzhou, and the Yüan Dynasty of the Mongols took control of all of China (Hucker
1975). During its height in the latter half of the 13th century, the Mongol empire extended across
much of Eurasia, bounded by Egypt, Poland, Java, and Japan (Weatherford 2004). Divided into
four khanates, of which Khubilai Khan ruled one, the Mongol empire “brought China several
decades of domestic peace and caravan trade across Asia” (Fairbank 1992, 124). One factor in
the increase of trade was Yüan domestic policy, including the expansion of the use of paper
money, lower taxes, stronger property rights, and improved transportation infrastructure
(Weatherford 2004). Aided by these policies, “Chinese society reached a peak of consumerism
which it never surpassed and perhaps never equaled” (Adshead 2000, 152). Improved
cartography and a cosmopolitan openness to foreigners also contributed to trade (Weatherford
2004). Khubilai Khan’s capital at modern-day Beijing welcomed traders “from as far away as
Italy, India, and North Africa,” as well as people of many diverse religions (Weatherford 2004,
198). It was into this China that Marco Polo arrived in 1275 (Masefield 1908). “Probably more
non-Chinese came into China under the Yüan dynasty than in any other period of Chinese
history till the nineteenth century,” writes Adshead (2000, 145). At the same time, the Mongols
sent ambassadors into the wider world as well: in the late 1280s, a Christian envoy from
Khubilai Khan’s court travelled all the way to England, where he served communion to King
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Edward I (Weatherford 2004). From domestic consumerism to an earnest interest in the outside
world, many factors drove the increase in trade under the Yüan.
Beyond these specific factors, the Mongols in general explicitly made the promotion of
trade across their vast empire a priority. As mentioned earlier, according to Weatherford (2004),
the Yüan kept up shelters every twenty to thirty miles along trade routes, providing provisions,
animals, and guides for travelers. They also created “an early type of combined passport and
credit card,” which “allowed the holder to travel throughout the empire and be assured of
protection, accommodations, transportation, and exemption from local taxes or duties”
(Weatherford 2004, 221). Furthermore, the Yüan raised the social status of merchants to rank
below only members of government, in direct contradiction of Confucian anti-merchant
prejudices (Weatherford 2004).
Known today as the pax Mongolica, the stable and trade-friendly society presided over by
Yüan rule contributed to an increase in contact between Asia and the West on all surviving trade
routes. It was during this time that the central land route truly emerged as an important and “real
international trade route” (Adshead 2000, 135). The northern land route, for its part, saw growth
in trade following the establishment of Black Sea ports such as Soldaia, Tana, and Caffa.
Considering its trade in “silk, spices, and pearls,” Adshead (2000) writes that “probably in its
heyday [the northern land route] carried a volume of traffic second only to the southern sea
route” (140-141). Furthermore, “for the first time… trade not culture was the major component
of the contact” along all routes (Adshead 2000, 142). Not merely idealistic proponents of
cosmopolitanism, the Yüan realized what they had to gain financially from foreign trade.
According to Adshead (2000), the salt monopoly provided 50% of the government’s total
revenue in the years following Khubilai Khan’s reign, and as much as 80% by the 1320s.
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Maritime trade, for its part, continued to grow as it had done during the later Song. By
this time, the southern sea route had absorbed the traffic of the far southern sea route, which
vanished from significance. Transporting, as always, more goods than either of the land routes,
the southern sea route’s growth was attributable to increased demand for minerals, textiles, and
spices, particularly for pepper, on both its Asian and European ends (Adshead 2000). Chinese
shipbuilding and navigational technology continued to advance, encouraged by Khubilai Khan
(Weatherford 2004). It is likely that Chinese hands took increasingly more control of the actual
shipping activity along the southern sea route (Adshead 2000). Khubilai’s ambitions of conquest
in Southeast Asia also propelled Chinese trade with these regions (Brook 2010). Adshead (2000)
writes that the southern sea route trade was stable compared to the “hot-house caravan trade of
the central land route,” and that under the Yüan it attained dynamics that would continue until
the 1700s (139).
Despite the increased flow of trade, and exporting more technologically advanced goods,
China ran trade deficits with Europe. It imported base iron, copper and tin from Europe and
exported silk, porcelain, and nautical technology (including the sternpost rudder, magnetic
compass, gunpowder, and improved clocks) (Adshead 2000). China exported precious metals to
Europe in order to finance its trade deficit (Adshead 2000). Thus Adshead (2000) writes that “for
China, outside commodities were a source of impoverishment,” and he identifies “the beginnings
of a negative attitude toward foreign trade” (153). These dynamics would play out dramatically
in the centuries to come.
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The Ming Dynasty and trade

The Ming dynasty was founded in 1368, when Chinese rebels finally ousted the Mongols
(Hucker 1975). According to Adshead (2000), the early Ming state was “anti-capitalist,”
receiving much of what it needed “by command rather than the market” (177). More important to
the early Ming than commerce were diplomacy and international influence. Emerging from
nearly a century of Mongol Rule, the Ming looked to reassert Chinese cultural prominence
throughout East Asia as a way to consolidate power. In an attempt to revive the tribute system,
the Ming commissioned the naval admiral Zheng He on seven missions that reached as far as
Java and Persia between the years 1405-1431 (Mostern 2013). These missions did not intend to
“occupy territory, profit from maritime commerce, or explore new lands” but rather to
“legitimate the Ming in the maritime world by gathering acknowledgments of its supremacy”
(Mostern 2013, 114). Adshead (2000) notes an ulterior motive in these missions, claiming that
“the early Ming state disliked private enterprise” and that the revival of the tribute system also
aimed to “end the anomaly of foreign countries having relations with China through [overseas,
private] Chinese merchants” (198). In both regards the voyages succeeded, temporarily
increasing the number of countries sending tribute to China and stifling the activities of overseas
Chinese merchants along the southern sea route (Adshead 2000).
Beginning in the 1420s, however, the Ming began to pull resources away from southern
sea diplomacy. The Mongol threat to the north had reignited, diverting the Ming’s attentions, and
piracy plaguing the southern coast had significantly increased the riskiness of sea travel (Mostern
2013). When the Ming pulled resources away from maintaining the overseas tribute system,
tribute sent to China diminished (Adshead 2000). Around the same time, the Ming withdrew
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troops from Central Asia and built up the Great Wall (Hucker 1975). Hucker (1975) attributes to
the early Ming a “xenophobic isolationism” (138). “Though China by no means cowered within
its frontiers,” He writes, “its attitude toward outsiders became decidedly defensive” (139). While
retrenching and fortifying itself, the Ming also prohibited private sea trade as an additional
protection against the outside world. This severely impacted the economies of the provinces on
the southern coast (Mostern 2013).
The government’s preferences could not sway the profit-orientation of individuals,
however, and “by the end of the dynasty the government was forced to take the merchants back
into more equal partnership” (Adshead 2000, 178). As time went on, “the later court tolerated
more trade and migration than official polices would have dictated,” and in fact, “private trade
flourished, Chinese merchant ships sailed the seas, and overseas Chinese merchants worked with
rulers and traders throughout the maritime world” (Mostern 2013, 115). The reality of exchange
belying prohibitive official policies had important implications as Europeans arrived on the
scene.
While the avenues through which the outside world encountered China were changing,
the substance of the interaction was also evolving. For example, the types of goods exchanged
between East and West went through a transition. Adshead (2000) explains that “Europe’s
imports and exports shifted from the simple to the complex; China’s from the complex to the
simple” (210). The spice trade peaked and then somewhat declined, as China’s pepper imports
fell and European demand, while growing to fill the void, proved incapable of supporting overall
market growth. Incense, including musk, ambergris, and camphor, similarly enjoyed increased
demand from Europe but to a degree that was insufficient to support previous trade levels
(Adshead 2000). Certain Chinese medicines also found favor in Europe, as did tea for the first
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time. Regarding technology, China, as it had during the late Song and the Yüan, found itself
giving more than it received. According to Adshead (2000), while China introduced technology
as notable as the printing press, European technology exports to China “were only decoration,
not acceleration, of major currents in Chinese history” (224). The Ming found itself confirmed in
the belief that Europe had little to offer China beyond silver. This dynamic is summarized in
Table 8. Some of the species found in the New World (called American Silver) by the Spanish
Empire were traded into the Ottoman, Persian and Chinese territories. As the flow of silver from
America finally contracted in the seventeenth century and the Spanish, Portuguese, and Dutch
trading systems all entered hard times, China’s contact with the world at large went into a
decline (Adshead, 2000).

Table 8: Goods, technology, and ideas exchanged between China and Europe under the
Ming
Exported to Europe
Exported to China
Silk
American silver
Porcelain
Zinc, cupro-nickel (as silver substitutes)
China root, rhubarb (medicines)
Tea
Printing
Crankshaft
Written examination system
Some hydraulic devices
Alcohol distillation
Table constructed from information in Adshead 2000, 216-229

Chinese rulers and traders from the Tang through the Ming displayed a variety of
attitudes toward Silk Road trade risk over the years. Where the Tang happily engaged in trade
while allowing Arab ships and other non-Chinese traders to handle the risk of transporting cargo,
the Song took a more active role in trade, establishing monopolies over certain goods and
allowing private markets, shipbuilding, and Chinese-led sea trade to flourish. It was under the
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Song that Chinese partnerships and joint-stock companies developed as risk-management
approaches to maritime trade. The Yüan went even farther than the Song in its promotion of
trade, becoming the first dynasty to take responsibility for risk mitigation all along the land
routes while simultaneously promoting Chinese-led trade along the sea routes. The Ming, on the
other hand, decided that the risks of foreign trade outweighed the benefits and prohibited private
sea trade, although its actions did not always reflect its official policies. Regardless of historical
context, risk remained a primary consideration in Silk Road trade, and different regimes’
approaches had important consequences.

The Europeans
While Europeans, namely the Portuguese, Spanish, English (eventually British) and
Dutch, did not establish a significant Silk Road presence until the 1500s, their arrival on the
scene proved to be a game-changer, especially for land trade routes in Central Asia and Middle
East. While all four countries had an important effect on trade, it was the British and the Dutch
whose approaches to risk management proved hardiest and most influential on modern
international business. In the long run, they changed the industrial organization of east-west
trade taking place in these routes.
In 1511, the Portuguese took over Malacca on the coast of present-day Malaysia (Hucker
1975). Central Ming authorities were not pleased by their presence, but the Portuguese proved
helpful in struggles against pirates, and in return local government authorities granted the
Portuguese permission to permanently occupy Macao beginning in 1557 (Adshead 2000). Since
trade was only allowed within the tribute system, the Portuguese appealed to the Ming court for
tributary status but were rejected (Brook 2010). Locked out of the tribute system but determined
to trade, the Portuguese found their way into an existing intra-regional secondary market for
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Chinese goods that revolved around tributary states (Brook, 2010). Brook (2010) describes this
secondary market as “a ‘world-economy’… a relatively autonomous but internally integrated
trading zone” extant since the latter 1400s (226-227). When the Spanish settled at Manila in
1570 and the Dutch at Java in 1609, they joined the Portuguese as newcomers to this thriving
network (Brook 2010). The details of their particular positions within this network are described
in Table 9 below. Adshead (2000) believes the Spanish Manila system to be the overall superior
route. Driven by a silver supply so plentiful that the Mexican dollar eventually became an
accepted form of Chinese currency, “Manila throve for two centuries, where Macao dwindled as
an isolated city state, and the [Dutch East India Company], for all its modernity, stumbled into
bankruptcy…” (208). In the course of their activities, the Europeans established new trading
routes, the Cape Route and the Pacific Route (Table 9).
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Table 9: European trading systems during the Ming
Country
Portuguese

Name
Macao system

Base
Macao




Spanish

Manila system

Manila

Dutch

Batavia system

Batavia
(modern-day
Jakarta)

Characteristics
-“direct, territorial contact
through the medium of bullion”
(203)
-sometimes “troubled by
Chinese officialdom” (208)
-managed by Portuguese
government institutions
-served European market
-“traded offshore served by
Chinese private enterprise” (208)
-functioned on a “simple, barterlike trading mechanism” (208)
-was “essentially a colony of
Mexico” with “abundant and
reliable” silver supply (207)
-served European and American
markets
-“carried the most significant
volume of goods in both
directions” of ANY Chinese
trade route, land or sea, at this
time (208)
-“indirect offshore contact
through the medium of goods”
(204)
-“more rational than the Macao
system” (206)
-managed by the Dutch East
India Company, a “herald of
private enterprise” (206)
-served European market

Table constructed from information in Adshead, 2000

The fates of various trading routes, both new and old, during the time of the European
entry are summarized in Table 10.
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Table 10: The fate of various trade routes under the Ming
Route
Central land route

Northern land route
Southern sea route

Cape route

Fate
Peaked and then declined

Rendered “blocked and
lifeless” (203)
Declined, “reduced to
second-class traffic in the
hands of humbler
merchants” (200)
Created by the Portuguese
and adopted by the Dutch

Pacific route

Cause of Change
Peak: Tamerlane’s attacks
on northern land route and
southern sea route forced
additional traffic into
central land route
Decline: Wars in the
sixteenth century, including
the Safavid reformation
Ravaged by Tamerlane
Lost traffic to new Cape
route after Portuguese
captured Malacca in 1511
Macao system of
Portuguese
Batavia system of Dutch
Manila system of the
Spanish

Created by the Spanish and
became “the most important
link between China and the
outside world” during its
time (206)
Table constructed from information in Adshead 2000, 195-209

While the Portuguese and the Spanish both had important impacts on maritime Silk Road
trade, it is the Dutch Republic and the British Empire that are most relevant to the risk
management discussion. In the Dutch Republic, while temporary partnerships had proven
generally sufficient to finance Dutch trade voyages to West Africa, Italy, and the Caribbean, the
introduction of ventures to Asia raised capital requirements by as much as two- to four-fold
(Gelderblom & Jonker 2004). Voyages to Asia also entailed substantially higher risks, and
investors would need to accept longer timetables for return given the length of the voyages. The
first response to this challenge was the oversight of voyages to Asia by merchant committees,
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who then sold subshares to their personal contacts in order to divide risk where “both shares and
subshares were fully understood to be limited liability, and transferable… which helped to
safeguard liquidity” ((Gelderblom & Jonker 2004, 649). Like modern shares of common stock,
subshares in these early enterprises provided profit and risk commensurate with investment, but
unlike modern common stock, subshareholders “had no say in the management” (Gelderblom &
Jonker 2004, 649).
By the time that the Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie or
VOC) was formed out of several extant trade companies in 1602, the directors were well aware
of the cash flow problems facing the sector. During 1600 and 1601, for example, revenues of
trade ventures had “lagged about 1.5 million guilders behind total investment,” which was of
clear concern for investors (Gelderblom & Jonker 2004, 650). To help shareholders raise
liquidity, the VOC’s directors allowed investors to pay for newly purchased shares in four
installments over five years, which better matched the timing of investments against that of
returns (Gelderblom & Jonker 2004). When, as a result of this policy, the VOC found itself
without adequate cash to prepare its ships for sailing, it encouraged shareholders to pay in
advance of when their installments were due by offering 8% interest on early payments
(Gelderblom & Jonker 2004). The VOC further supplemented its cash flow through the
Amsterdam money market (Gelderblom & Jonker 2004). Notably, unlike earlier companies, the
VOC encountered sufficient investor interest that over two-thirds of its capital was raised from
investors. Gelderblom & Jonker (2004) state that “the Amsterdam chamber had more than 1,100
initial subscribers on an estimated adult population of no more than 50,000 people” (654). Even
small-scale investors were eager to participate due to profits of previous Asian trade ventures
(Gelderblom & Jonker 2004).
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However, the real success of VOC shares among investors came from their ease of
transferability, an innovation at the time. The VOC promoted share transferability as a way of
justifying the fact that it wanted to tie up investors’ capital for ten years, a strategy it thought
important in building a lasting presence vis-à-vis English and Portuguese competition. In action,
the VOC’s straightforward share transfer policy had the effect of creating a thriving secondary
market (Gelderblom & Jonker 2004). Before the creation of the VOC, shares of preceding trade
companies had been exchanged only among “a narrow circle of insiders,” but during the period
1603-1607, VOC shares traded at a rate of 100-200 shares per year (Gelderblom & Jonker 2004,
653). “Selling shares had now become so common,” state Gelderblom & Jonker (2004), “that the
VOC board attempted to have its ten-year charter extended to 20 years, arguing that investors
could get their money back from the market immediately and thus would not be disadvantaged
from an extension” (656).
In a further indication of VOC’s share popularity, traders began to use VOC shares both
for speculation and as collateral on loans. Put into use as early as the month of the VOC’s
founding, VOC shares were “an ideal loan collateral” because they were “a claim on a company
known to all; very liquid, so easy to sell in case of default; with daily price quotations for quick
valuation; and with ownership easily ascertained” (Gelderblom & Jonker 2004, 660). On the
speculative side, traders explored futures trading (Gelderblom & Jonker 2004). Overall, the
VOC’s “active traders formed a large and varied crowd indeed” (Gelderblom & Jonker 2004,
658).
Considering that by 1608, the VOC’s returns exceeded investments by 6.3 million
guilders, it is clear that the VOC’s approach to risk management achieved its desired outcome in
the short term (Gelderblom & Jonker 2004). The very fact that its shares “provided the crucial
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breakthrough” in the genesis of secondary markets demonstrates that its risk was appropriately
delegated to parties happy to bear it (Gelderblom & Jonker 2004, 666). However, according to
Neal (2003), England’s East India Company reinterpreted the Dutch model in ways that arguably
positioned it for better long-term success.
The EIC, like the VOC, arose at the start of the 17th century in response to the high
capital requirements and risk inherent in long-distance trade (Chaudhuri 1999). Where the VOC
was titanic, however, the EIC was small and striving. The EIC’s starting capital amounted to a
mere £30,000, compared to the VOC’s £540,000 (Gardner 1972). As of 1610, the VOC had sent
60 ships to Asia, whereas the EIC had sent only 17 (Gardner 1972). Lawson (2013) goes so far
as to suggest that the EIC was “a last desperate throw” in England’s attempts to join the Dutch,
Spanish, and Portuguese in Asian trade (6). Nevertheless, by the time that William and Mary
took the English throne in 1689, the English began not only to imitate but also to improve upon
the Dutch approach to risk management. First of all, while the VOC did not increase its capital
stock over its original level throughout the course of its life, the EIC and other English
companies continued to issue new securities throughout the next century (Neal 2003). The
increasing supply of securities enhanced their liquidity and thus sustained their usefulness as
loan collateral (Neal 2003). By contrast, without a similar increase in supply and liquidity, the
usefulness of VOC shares as loan collateral eventually dwindled, and by 1720, “even the Dutch
merchants turned increasingly to using British securities as collateral for their loans” (Neal 2003,
14). Although the liquidity of VOC shares proved a revolutionary force in Dutch financial
markets when first introduced, this liquidity was not sustained, to the eventual detriment of
Dutch competitiveness vis-à-vis the English.
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Secondly, in addition to the liquidity gap, the EIC and other English companies surpassed
the VOC by doing away with various inefficiencies particular to Dutch operations. For example,
only half of VOC stock could be transferred through the VOC’s main Amsterdam office (Neal
2003). This was due in part to the fact that the VOC’s capital stock was distributed among its six
regional chambers (Neal 2003). The EIC, on the other hand, made 100% of its capital stock
transferable through its London office (Neal 2003). Furthermore, the EIC and other English
institutions made their securities available for daily transfer, whereas the VOC limited transfers
to a monthly or quarterly schedule (Neal 2003). Finally, stockholders of the EIC had the power
to elect directors, and even foreigners were invited to purchase stock, further enhancing liquidity
(Neal 2003). Overall, the English rationalized the VOC model and constructed it within a more
centralized organizational framework, enhancing its liquidity and eliminating various
inefficiencies. Together, these factors strengthened the EIC’s approach to risk management and
contributed to its ability to outlast the VOC by three quarters of a century. After these
capitalizations of trade with mitigated risks, East-West trade substantially changed in structure,
organization and profitability.

Conclusions
China had better technology than its western trading partners for much of the Silk Road
history. This East-West flow of trade created one of the most important trade routes in world
history. Throughout the different dynasties, China alternated between having trade surpluses and
trade deficits, and between free trade policies and mercantilist policies.
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Capital markets were thin in all countries throughout Silk Road history. Trader risks were
private risks or were partially backed by governments and resulted in many merchant failures in
monopolistically competitive markets with small scale firms.
Deep capital markets were realized by the Dutch and the English who formed institutions
to share risks among merchants and shareholders and therefore also increased liquidity pools.
These institutionalized risk sharing revolutionized trade, brought changes to home markets yet
turned some of this trade to ‘immiserating growth’ for eastern regions. Trade then had to be
conducted through colonial and militarily suppressive relationships. The land trade routes though
Central Asia and MENA slowly dried up, leaving urban decay, unemployment and anarchy in its
trails which persist to this day in some areas.
In the meantime, technological change and import substitution in the West as well
as intensive agriculture in the newly discovered continent shifted the focus of world trade from
China to Americas (New World). Liquidity, trade credit focused on the New World, where sugar
cane, mahogany, cotton, coffee, tobacco, cocoa had high rates of return, yet the production of
which was made possible with (unfortunate) slave labor. World trade became more oligopolistic
with terms of trade very favorable to colonial powers.
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Appendix
Country-specific source information for Table 3, provided by Bolt & Van Zanden:
Italy
1300-1911’, European Review of Economic History 15 (2): 169-219. Data prior to 1861 refer to
Centre-North Italy.
1861-1990 from Baffigi, A. (2011). “Italian National Accounts, 1861-2011”, Banca d’Italia
Economic History Working Papers 18.
Netherlands
Data 1348-1807 from Van Zanden, J. L. and B. van Leeuwen (2012). Figures prior to 1807 apply
to Holland only.
From 1807-1913 from Smits, J.P., E. Horlings and J.L. van Zanden (2000). The Measurement of
Gross National Product and its Components 1800-1913 (Groningen Growth and Development
Centre Monograph series no 5).
Portugal
Reis, J., Martins, C.A., and Costa, L.F. (2011). “New Estimates of Portugal’s GDP per Capita,
1500-1850,” Prepared for the “Quantifying long run economic development conference”,
University of Warwick in Venice, 22-24 March 2011.
Spain
1270 – 1850 from Álvarez-Nogal, C. and L. Prados de la Escosura (2013). "The Rise and Fall of
Spain (1270- 1850)," Economic History Review, 66, 1, 1-37, using their annual benchmarks.
China
Maddison’s original estimates.
India
1600 – 1871 from Broadberry, S. J. Custodis and B. Gupta, (2013) India and the Great
Divergence: An Anglo- Indian comparison of GDP per capita 1600 – 1871, London School of
Economics Working paper, table. 14, p. 38.
Indonesia/Java
1880-2008 from Van der Eng, P. (2010). “The Source of Long-Term Economic Growth in
Indonesia, 1880-2008”, Explorations in Economic History, 47: 294-309.
In 1880 the ratio Java/Indonesia was 0.8211.
Japan
730-1870 (1872) from Bassino, J.P., S. Broadberry, K. Fukao, B. Gupta and M. Takashima
(2011). “Japan and the Great Divergence, 730-1870”, Working Paper, p. 20, table 6, GDP pc
International 1990 dollars.
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South Korea
1820 - 1940 trend from original Maddison estimates applied to benchmark for 1934/36 from
Fukao, K., D. Ma and T. Yuan (2007). Real GDP in Pre-War East Asia: A 1934-36 Benchmark
Purchasing Power Parity Comparison with the U.S. Review of Income and Wealth, 53 (3): 503 537.
Iraq
700-1500 from Pamuk, . and M. Shatzmiller (2011). “Real Wages and GDP per capita in the
Medieval Islamic Middle East in Comparative Perspective, 700-1500”, paper presented at the 9th
Conference of the European Historical Economics Society, Dublin, September 2-3, 2011.
Turkey/Byzantium/Ottoman Empire
700-1500 from Pamuk, . and M. Shatzmiller (2011). “Real Wages and GDP per capita in the
Medieval Islamic Middle East in Comparative Perspective, 700-1500”, paper presented at the 9th
Conference of the European Historical Economics Society, Dublin, September 2-3, 2011;
Milanovic, B. (2006), “An estimate of average income and inequality in Byzantium around year
1000,” Review of Income and Wealth 52 (3).

i

Trade under the Tang was heavily regulated in terms of both goods and trading partners
(Schafer 1963). The “tribute system” served as the “institutional setting and indeed cover for
foreign trade” (Fairbank 1992, 113). Under the tribute system, China’s neighbors (particularly
nomadic tribes) were expected to send gifts to the Chinese emperor as a way of recognizing
China’s cultural superiority (Fairbank 1992). Because China’s neighbors were aware that, in
exchange for their tributary gifts, they would receive ample gifts from the Tang court in return,
most of them acquiesced to this arrangement “out of sheer self-interest” (Schafer 1963, 24).

1

Indonesia includes Timor until 1999
Indonesia is Java before 1880
3
2008 growth calculated using 2007 as previous period
2
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